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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, the definition of the Shapley function for fuzzy cooperative games is
given, which is obtained by extending the classical case. The specific expression of the
Shapley function for fuzzy cooperative games with multilinear extension form is given,
and its existence and uniqueness are discussed. Furthermore, the properties of the Shapley
function are researched. Finally, the fuzzy core for this kind of game is defined, and the
relationship between the fuzzy core and the Shapley function is shown.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Shapley value [1] as an important solution concept in cooperative game theory has been studied by a number of
researchers, which shows a vector whose elements are agents’ share derived from several reasonable bases.
Aubin [2] first studied the problem of cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions (that is, fuzzy cooperative games). The
fuzzy coalition is a collection of players who transfer fractions of their representability to a specific coalition. Namely, a
membership grade shows to what extent a player transfers his representability and is called participation level (rate) or
membership degree. Generally, the characteristic function for fuzzy cooperative games is difficult to obtain. Hence, people
usually construct the characteristic function for fuzzy cooperative games by the classical case [3–5]. The Shapley function
and fuzzy core for fuzzy cooperative games have been researched in [3–11].
However, the Shapley function for fuzzy cooperative games with multilinear extension form [3] has not been discussed
yet. In this paper, wewill paymore attention to this problem, and the existence and uniqueness of the given Shapley function
are proved. Meantime, we study the fuzzy core for fuzzy cooperative games with multilinear extension form.
2. Preliminaries
Let N denote the set of players, and L(N) the set of all fuzzy coalitions in N . The crisp coalitions in N are denoted by
S0, T0, . . . . For all S0 ⊆ N , the cardinality of S0 is denoted by |S0|. Let v(S0) indicate the value of S0 ⊆ N . The fuzzy coalitions
in L(N) are denoted by S, T , . . . . For fuzzy coalition S and player i, S(i) indicates the membership grade of i in S, i.e., the rate
of the ith player in S. The support is denoted by Supp S = {i ∈ N | S(i) > 0}. We use the notation S ⊆ T if and only if
S(i) = T (i) or S(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N . In the following, for any S ∈ L(N), we will use S = {S(i1), S(i2), . . . , S(iT )} to denote it,
and we will omit braces for singletons, e.g. by writing U(i), S ∨ (∧)T , S \ T instead of {U(i)}, {S} ∨ (∧){T }, {S} \ {T } for any
{U(i)}, S, T ∈ L(N).
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A function v : L(N)→ R, satisfying v(∅) = 0, is called a set function. Let v(S) denote the value of S ∈ L(N),G(N) denotes
the set of all fuzzy games. For any S, T ∈ L(N), S ∨ T denotes the union of fuzzy coalitions S and T , namely i ∈ Supp(S ∨ T )
if and only if i ∈ Supp S ∪ Supp T and (S ∨ T )(i) = S(i) ∨ T (i); S ∧ T denotes the intersection of fuzzy coalitions S and T ,
namely i ∈ Supp(S ∧ T ) if and only if i ∈ Supp S ∩ Supp T and (S ∧ T )(i) = S(i) ∧ T (i).
Definition 2.1. v ∈ G(N) is said to be fuzzy convex if it satisfies the following
v(T )+ v(S) ≤ v(S ∨ T )+ v(S ∧ T )
for all S, T ∈ L(N).
Definition 2.2. Let U ∈ L(N) and v ∈ G(N). S ⊆ U is called a fuzzy carrier for v in U if
v(S ∧ T ) = v(T )
for all T ⊆ U .
Definition 2.3. Let U ∈ L(N) and v ∈ G(N), if we have v(S ∨ U(i))− v(S) = v(U(i)) for all S ⊆ U with i 6∈ Supp S, then i is
called a fuzzy dummy player for v in U .
Definition 2.4. Let U ∈ L(N) and v ∈ G(N), if we have v(S ∨ U(i)) = v(S) for all S ⊆ U with i 6∈ Supp S, then i is called a
fuzzy null player for v in U .
3. The Shapley function for fuzzy cooperative games with multilinear extension form
In this section, we will discuss a special kind of fuzzy cooperative games, which is proposed by Owen [3]. The value of
the fuzzy coalition for this class of fuzzy cooperative games is written by
v(U) =
∑
T0⊆Supp U
{∏
i∈T0
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp U\T0
(1− U(i))
}
· v(T0), (1)
where U ∈ L(N).
The following part of this paper, the value of S ⊆ U is expressed by
v(S) =
∑
T0⊆Supp S
{∏
i∈T0
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp U\T0
(1− U(i))
}
· v(T0),
which is different to Owen’s [3].
Namely, the players have an influence on the values of other players. We use GOw(U) to denote this kind of fuzzy
cooperative games on U ∈ L(N).
3.1. The Shapley function for GOw(U)
Definition 3.1. Let U ∈ L(N) and v ∈ G(U). The function f : L(U)→ RL(U) is called a Shapley function on G(U) if it satisfies
the following three axioms.
Axiom 1 (Efficiency). If T is a fuzzy carrier for v in U , then∑
i∈Supp T
fi(U, v) = v(T ).
Axiom 2 (Symmetry). For any i, j ∈ SuppU and any S ⊆ U with i, j 6∈ Supp S, we have v(S ∨ U(i)) = v(S ∨ U(j)), then
fi(U, v) = fj(U, v).
Axiom 3 (Additivity). Let v1, v2 ∈ G(U), if there exists v1 + v2 ∈ G(U) such that (v1 + v2)(S) = v1(S)+ v2(S) for all S ⊆ U ,
then
fi(U, v1 + v2) = fi(U, v1)+ fi(U, v2)
for all i ∈ SuppU .
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Theorem 3.1. Let U ∈ L(N) and v ∈ GOw , the function ϕ : L(U)→ RL(U) is defined by
ϕi(U, v) =
∑
T0⊆Supp U\{i}
(|T0|)!(|SuppU| − |T0| − 1)!
|Supp U|! ·
( ∑
S0⊆T0∪{i}
(∏
j∈S0
U(j) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\S0
(1− U(j))
)
· v(S0)
−
(∏
j∈S0
U(j) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\S0
(1− U(j))
)
· v(S0)
)
∀i ∈ SuppU . (2)
Then ϕ is the unique Shapley function for v ∈ GOw(U) in U.
Proof (Existence).
Axiom 1. For any T0 ⊆ SuppU \ {i}, since∑
S0⊆T0∪{i}
(∏
j∈S0
U(j) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\S0
(1− U(j))
)
· v(S0) =
∑
S0⊆T0
(∏
j∈S0
U(j) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\S0
(1− U(j))
)
· v(S0)
+
∑
S0⊆T0,i∈S0
(∏
j∈S0
U(j) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\S0
(1− U(j))
)
· v(S0).
We have Eq. (2) is equivalent to Eq. (3)
ϕi(U, v) =
∑
i∈T0⊆Supp U
(|T0| − 1)!(|SuppU| − |T0|)!
|SuppU|! ·
( ∑
S0⊆T0,i∈S0
(∏
j∈S0
U(j) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\S0
(1− U(j))
)
· v(S0)
)
∀i ∈ SuppU . (3)
First, we prove
ϕik(U, v) = a1k +
1
2
a2k + · · · +
1
m
amk ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, (4)
where SuppU = {i1, i2, . . . , im}withm ≤ n, and
a1k = v(ik) · U(ik) ·
∏
ij∈Supp U\{ik}
(1− U(ij)),
a2k =
∑
ip∈Supp U\{ik}
v(ik, ip) · U(ik) · U(ip) · ∏
ij∈Supp U\{ik,ip}
(1− U(ij))
 ,
. . . ,
amk = v(i1, i2, . . . , im) ·
∏
ij∈Supp U
U(ij).
When |SuppU| = 1, it obviously holds;
When |SuppU| = 2, without loss of generality, let SuppU = {i, j}. We get
ϕi(U, v) = v(i) · U(i) · (1− U(j))+ 12v(i, j) · U(i) · U(j),
ϕj(U, v) = v(j) · U(j) · (1− U(i))+ 12v(i, j) · U(i) · U(j),
and
ϕi(U, v)+ ϕj(U, v) = v(U).
Suppose that
ϕik(U, v) = a1k +
1
2
· a2k + · · · +
1
p
· apk
for any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, where SuppU = {i1, i2, . . . , ip} and 2 ≤ p = |SuppU| ≤ m− 1.
In the following, we shall show
ϕik(U, v) = a1k +
1
2
· a2k + · · · +
1
p
· apk +
1
p+ 1 · a
p+1
k ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , p, p+ 1},
where SuppU = {i1, i2, . . . , ip, ip+1}.
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From Eq. (3), we know
ϕik (U, v) =
p!
(p+ 1)! · a
1
k +
1!(p− 1)!
(p+ 1)! · (C
1
p · a1k + a2k)+
2!(p− 2)!
(p+ 1)! ·
(
C2p · a1k + C1p−1 · a2k + a3k
)+ · · ·
+ (p− 1)!1!
(p+ 1)! ·
(
Cp−1p · a1k + Cp−2p−1 · a2k + · · · + apk
)
+ p!
(p+ 1)! ·
(
Cpp · a1k + Cp−1p−1 · a2k + · · · + ap+1k
)
=
(
p!
(p+ 1)! +
1!(p− 1)!
(p+ 1)! · C
1
p +
2!(p− 2)!
(p+ 1)! · C
2
p + · · · +
(p− 1)!1!
(p+ 1)! · C
p−1
p +
p!
(p+ 1)! · C
p
p
)
· a1k
+
(
1!(p− 1)!
(p+ 1)! +
2!(p− 2)!
(p+ 1)! · C
1
p−1 + · · · +
(p− 1)!1!
(p+ 1)! · C
p−2
p−1 +
p!
(p+ 1)! · C
p−1
p−1
)
· a2k + · · ·
+
(
(p− 1)!1!
(p+ 1)! +
p!
(p+ 1)!
)
· apk +
p!
(p+ 1)! · a
p+1
k
= (p+ 1) · 1
p+ 1 · a
1
k +
1+ 2+ · · · + p
p(p+ 1) · a
2
k + · · · +
(
1
p(p+ 1) +
1
p+ 1
)
· apk +
1
p+ 1 · a
p+1
k
= a1k +
1
2
· a2k + · · · +
1
p
· apk +
1
p+ 1 · a
p+1
k .
From the arbitrariness of k and mathematical induction, we get Eq. (4).
Secondly, we show
∑
i∈Supp U ϕi(U, v) = v(U). From Eq. (4), we have
m∑
k=1
ϕik(U, v) =
m∑
k=1
(
a1k +
1
2
a2k + · · · +
1
m
amk
)
=
∑
T0⊆Supp U
{∏
i∈T0
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp U\T0
(1− U(i))
}
· v(T0)
= v(U).
Since T is a fuzzy carrier for v in U , we have
v(T ) = v(T ∧ U) = v(U) =
∑
i∈Supp U
ϕi(U, v).
For all i ∈ SuppU with i 6∈ Supp T , we have
v(S ∨ U(i)) = v((S ∨ U(i)) ∧ T ) = v((S ∧ T ) ∨ (U(i) ∧ T )) = v(S ∧ T ) = v(S)
for all S ⊆ U with i 6∈ Supp S.
From Definition 2.4, we know i is a fuzzy null player for v in U . Thus,
v(T ) = v(T ∧ U) = v(U) =
∑
i∈Supp U
ϕi(U, v) =
∑
i∈Supp T
ϕi(U, v).
Axiom 2. From v(S ∨ U(i)) = v(S ∨ U(j)) and Eq. (3), we obtain
ϕi(U, v) =
∑
i∈T0⊆Supp U
(|T0| − 1)!(|SuppU| − |T0|)!
|SuppU|! ·
( ∑
S0⊆T0,i∈S0
(∏
k∈S0
U(k) ·
∏
k∈Supp U\S0
(1− U(k))
)
· v(S0)
)
=
∑
i∈T0⊆Supp U
(|T0| − 1)!(|SuppU| − |T0|)!
|SuppU|! ·
( ∑
S0⊆T0,i∈S0,j6∈S0
(∏
k∈S0
U(k) ·
∏
k∈Supp U\S0
(1− U(k))
)
· v(S0)
+
∑
S0⊆T0,i,j∈S0
(∏
k∈S0
U(k) ·
∏
k∈Supp U\S0
(1− U(k))
)
· v(S0)
)
=
∑
j∈T0⊆Supp U
(|T0| − 1)!(|SuppU| − |T0|)!
|SuppU|! ·
( ∑
S0⊆T0,j∈S0,i6∈S0
(∏
k∈S0
U(k) ·
∏
k∈Supp U\S0
(1− U(k))
)
· v(S0)
+
∑
S0⊆T0,i,j∈S0
(∏
k∈S0
U(k) ·
∏
k∈Supp U\S0
(1− U(k))
)
· v(S0)
)
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=
∑
j∈T0⊆Supp U
(|T0| − 1)!(|SuppU| − |T0|)!
|SuppU|! ·
( ∑
S0⊆T0,j∈S0
(∏
k∈S0
U(k)
∏
k∈Supp U\S0
(1− U(k))
)
· v(S0)
)
= ϕj(U, v).
Axiom 3. From Eq. (2), it obviously holds.
Uniqueness. Similar the uniqueness proof of the Shapley function in classical case, we give the following process.
For any T ⊆ U with T 6= ∅, define the unanimity game uT on T as follows:
uT (R) =
{
0 otherwise
1 T ⊆ R ⊆ U . (5)
For any 0 ≤ c ∈ R, from efficiency and symmetry, we obtain
ϕi(cuT ) =
{
0 otherwise
c
|Supp T | i ∈ Supp T .
(6)
In the following, we will show v ∈ GOw(U) can be expressed by
v =
∑
∅6=T⊆U
cTuT , (7)
where cT =∑S⊆T (−1)|Supp T |−|Supp S|v(S), and uT is expressed as Eq. (5).
For any S ⊆ U with S 6= ∅, we have( ∑
∅6=T⊆U
cTuT
)
(S) =
∑
∅6=T⊆U
cTuT (S)
=
∑
∅6=T⊆S
cT
=
∑
∅6=T⊆S
∑
W⊆T
(−1)|Supp T |−|Supp W | · v(W )
=
∑
W⊆S
( ∑
∅6=T⊆S
(−1)|Supp T |−|Supp W |
)
· v(W )
=
∑
W⊆S
( |Supp S|∑
|Supp T |=|Supp W |
(−1)|Supp T |−|Supp W |
(|Supp S| − |SuppW |
|Supp T | − |SuppW |
))
· v(W ).
Since
∑n
i=0(−1)i
(
n
i
)
= 0 for any n ∈ N, we have
|Supp S|∑
|Supp T |=|Supp W |
(−1)|Supp T |−|Supp W |
(|Supp S| − |SuppW |
|Supp T | − |SuppW |
)
= 0 ∀W ⊂ S.
Hence, v(S) =
(∑
∅6=T⊆U cTuT
)
(S) holds. From Eqs. (6), (7) and additivity, we know the function ϕ is uniquely
determined by U and v ∈ GOw(U). This completes the proof. 
Property 3.1. Let U ∈ L(N) and v ∈ GOw , if i ∈ SuppU is a fuzzy dummy player for v in U, then
ϕi(U, v) = v(i) · U(i) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\{i}
(1− U(j)).
Proof. For all S ⊆ U with i 6∈ Supp S, we have v(S ∨ U(i))− v(S) = v(U(i)). Since,
v(U(i)) = v(i) · U(i) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\{i}
(1− U(j)),
v(S) =
∑
T0⊆Supp S
(∏
j∈T0
U(j) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\T0
(1− U(j))
)
· v(T0),
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v(S ∨ U(i)) =
∑
T0⊆Supp(S∨U(i))
(∏
j∈T0
U(j) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\T0
(1− U(j))
)
· v(T0).
Thus, for any T0 ⊆ Supp(S ∨ U(i))with i ∈ T0 and T0 6= {i}, we have(∏
j∈T0
U(j) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\T0
(1− U(j))
)
· v(T0) = 0.
From Eq. (3), we get
ϕi(U, v) =
∑
i∈T0⊆Supp U
(|T0| − 1)!(|SuppU| − |T0|)!
|SuppU|! ·
(
v(i) · U(i) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\{i}
(1− U(j))
)
= v(i) · U(i) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\{i}
(1− U(j)). 
Property 3.2. Let v,w ∈ GOw(U), if we have v(S) ≥ w(S) for all S ⊆ U, then
ϕi(U, v) ≥ ϕi(U, w)
for all i ∈ SuppU.
Proof. From Eq. (3), the result obviously holds. 
3.2. The fuzzy core for GOw(U)
Definition 3.2. Let U ∈ L(N) and v ∈ GOw(U), define
Co(U) =
{
xn |
n∑
i=1
xi =
∑
T0⊆Supp U
{∏
i∈T0
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp U\T0
(1− U(i))
}
· v(T0),
∑
i∈Supp S
xi ≥
∑
T0⊆Supp S
{∏
i∈T0
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp U\T0
(1− U(i))
}
· v(T0),∀S ⊆ U
}
,
then Co(U) is the fuzzy core for v in U .
Theorem 3.2. Let U ∈ L(N) and v ∈ GOw(U), if v is fuzzy convex, then Co(U) 6= ∅.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that SuppU = {i1, i2, . . . , im}, wherem ≤ n and i1 < i2 < · · · < im, let
xi1 = v({U(i1)}) = U(i1) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\{i1}
(1− U(j)) · v(i1),
xik = v({U(i1), . . . ,U(ik)})− v({U(i1), . . . ,U(ik−1)})
=
∑
T0⊆{i1,...,ik}
{∏
j∈T0
U(j) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\T0
(1− U(j))
}
· v(T0)
−
∑
T0⊆{i1,...,ik−1}
{∏
j∈T0
U(j) ·
∏
j∈Supp U\T0
(1− U(j))
}
· v(T0) k ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,m}.
From above, we have
n∑
i=1
xi =
∑
T0⊆Supp U
{∏
i∈T0
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp U\T0
(1− U(i))
}
· v(T0) = v(U).
For any S ⊆ U , let SuppU \ Supp S = {j1, j2, . . . , jp} such that j1 < j2 < · · · < jp, and T = {U(i1),U(i2), . . . ,U(j1)},
then S ∨ T = S ∨ U(j1) and S ∧ T = T \ U(j1), from the convexity of v, we have v(S)+ v(T ) ≤ v(S ∨ U(j1))+ v(T \ U(j1)),
namely,
xj1 = v(T )− v(T \ U(j1)) ≤ v(S ∨ U(j1))− v(S).
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Hence, ∑
l∈Supp S∪{j1}
xl −
∑
l∈Supp S
xl ≤ v(S ∨ U(j1))− v(S)
and ∑
l∈Supp S∪{j1}
xl − v(S ∨ U(j1)) ≤
∑
l∈Supp S
xl − v(S).
Similarly, let T = {U(i1),U(i2), . . . ,U(j1),U(j2)}, then we have∑
l∈Supp S∪{j1,j2}
xl − v(S ∨ U(j1) ∨ U(j2)) ≤
∑
l∈Supp S
xl − v(S).
By recursive relation, we get
0 =
∑
l∈Supp U
xl − v(U) ≤
∑
l∈Supp S
xl − v(S).
Namely,∑
i∈Supp S
xi ≥
∑
T0⊆Supp S
{∏
i∈T0
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp U\T0
(1− U(i))
}
· v(T0).
From Definition 3.2, we obtain {xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xim} ∈ Co(U) 6= ∅. 
Theorem 3.3. Let U ∈ L(N) and v ∈ GOw(U), if v is fuzzy convex, then ϕ ∈ Co(U).
Proof. From Definition 3.2, we know Co(U) is a convex set. From Theorem 3.2 and Eq. (2), we know ϕ(U, v) is the
combination of |SuppU|! elements in Co(U). Hence, ϕ ∈ Co(U) holds. 
Example 1. Let the player setN = {1, 2, 3}, v ∈ GOw(U) andU ∈ L(N), if we knowU(1) = 0.4,U(1) = 0.6 andU(3) = 0.8.
The crisp coalitions’ payoffs are given as follows:
v(i) = 1 (i = 1, 2, 3), v(1, 2) = 3, v(1, 3) = 5, v(2, 3) = 6, v(1, 2, 3) = 10.
From Eqs. (2), (3) or (4), we get the Shapley values ϕ1(U, v) = 1.25, ϕ2(U, v) = 1.67 and ϕ3(U, v) = 2.
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